How does the Lisbon Treaty expand the role of the European Parliament – and what are the implications for European democracy?
Institutionalising post-national democracy is one of the main themes that constitute the unfinished agenda of the European integration process. The claim of executive dominance at European level and ‘disconnection’ between citizens and European Union institutions – clearly evident in the low turnout of voters in the last European elections – led to successive revisions of the Treaties that progressively increased the power of the directlyelected European Parliament. In that process, mechanisms such as codecision procedures between the Council of (national) Ministers and the European Parliament have been introduced and adopted in many policy areas. The Treaty of Lisbon is the latest attempt to reduce the perceived democratic deficit. The stated aim of the Treaty is to enhance the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improve the coherence of its action. It is to be based, inter alia, on the principle of representative democracy – that is, according to the Treaty, a greater role for the European Parliament and greater involvement of national parliaments. This article will focus on the role of the European Parliament.

A greater role for the Parliament
The new treaty proposes the extension of co-decision procedure to new areas of policy, where the European Parliament used to be merely consulted or not involved at all. These areas include legal immigration, penal judicial co-operation (Eurojust, crime
prevention, the alignment of prison standards, offences and penalties), police co-operation (Europol) and some aspects of trade policy and agriculture. Co-decision procedure is to become the ordinary legislative procedure in the work of the Council
and the Parliament thus making the directly elected European Parliament equal in legislative weight in these areas with the Council of Ministers (where government representatives meet). In all fields governed by the ordinary legislative procedure, the European Parliament’s assent, under the Treaty of Lisbon, will be required for all international agreements.

Rights and obligations
In the few remaining areas (currently ‘special legislative procedures’), Parliament will either have the right of consent to a Council measure, or vice-versa. Certain areas where the old consultation procedure applied, will remain apart, with the Council
simply needing to consult the European Parliament before voting on Commission proposals and to take its views into account. In those cases, the Council would not be bound by Parliament’s decision, only by the obligation to consult it. However, Parliament would need to be consulted again if the Council deviated too far from the initial proposal. In addition, the new treaty confirms the established practice of working with a multi-annual financial framework, which Parliament will have to approve in future. But Parliament’s authority would be extended from ‘non-compulsory’ expenditure to include the budget in its entirety. On the other hand, the Commission would no longer be obliged to submit a preliminary draft budget to the Council, but to submit the budget proposal directly. This innovation creates a new balance between the Council and the Parliament when approving the EU’s budget: both will determine all expenditure together and the Parliament’s authority will be extended to include compulsory expenditure.

Information gap
Proponents of the Treaty of Lisbon claim that the increase of the directly elected Parliament’s power and relevance would make the decision making process more democratic. Their consideration is based mainly on research indications, which demonstrate that elections to the European Parliament are routinely turned into ‘second order’ elections in which concerns about national governments – or, more recently, issues handled by national governments – are aired. This is because intense efforts to stimulate electoral participation tend to encourage symbolic rather than substantive politics. In addition, there was an information gap created by a number of journalists who knew little about the EU; accordingly, parliamentarians had to work very hard to raise their profile. As a result, citizens (the majority of whom are aware, according to polls, of the increasing importance of the European Parliament) still turned out for direct elections in declining numbers. Thus, strengthening the democratic control by the European Parliament and expanding its powers, would extend majority voting and extenuate democratic deficit.

Countering opposition
Opponents argue that it is simply false that the European Parliament is weak. This is because executive dominance (which is the current situation at EUlevel) is simply a reproduction of the informal situation in the member states. Critics also observe that the European Parliament has already acquired something of a de facto scrutinising role where the conduct of Commissioners is concerned. This is evidenced, according to them, by the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 under EP pressure in addition to explicit powers to veto Commission line-ups (used mainly in 2004 against the Barrosso Commission). However, it should not be ignored that the rule of law requires legislative provisions; factual circumstances cannot fulfil the principles of democracy. Other counter arguments, such as those of the British think-tank Open Europe and the former Danish MEP Jens- Peter Bonde, are that the Treaty, if ratified, will centralise the EU and weaken democracy by moving power further away from national electorates. They seem to ignore the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon’s aim is to promote the role of national parliaments, not to create a European ‘super state’. Besides, this is an international treaty agreed by sovereign member states that consent to share some of their sovereignty in supranational cooperation and acknowledge that the Union reflects the will of the member states and their citizens, and that its powers stem from these states. As Professor Nicolaïdis rightly says, the EU remains more than a confederation of sovereign states with its peoples being connected through the European Parliament and a regional civil society. The Lisbon Treaty is going to continue bridging the gap between remote EU institutions and the citizens of member states. It establishes a clearer distribution of powers between the Union and its states, which will make it easier for citizens to understand ‘who does what’. In addition, the Treaty strengthens the democratic control of the European Union by its directly elected body, the European Parliament, thus ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens of the Union. As a result, the ‘them and us’ mentality is brought to an end and the Union becomes stronger and more effective.

Maria Ath Alexopoulou is a PhD Candidate